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The doubt of investors for the accuracy of financial reporting statements and the credibility of external audit functions 
has becoming more and more severe in the recent years due to a variety of booming accounting scandals related to 
earnings management occurring around the world. To cope with these serious frauds in the world of financial market, 
many countries have adopted Mandatory Audit Rotation (MAR) rules. Although the MAR rule has been valid around 
European Union (EU) members since 2016, the effectiveness of this rule has not been examined in any academic papers 
yet. As a result, the aim of this study is to investigate the effectiveness and the necessity of the latest MAR rule in the 
EU by testing the influence of audit rotation activities and audit tenure on earnings management of companies in the 
STOXX Europe 600 Index. Practical implications of this study will not also prove whether companies in STOXX Europe 
600 Index should be required to shorten their audit tenure by rotating their audit engagement more often in order to 
decline the degree of earnings management, but they will also help to strengthen support for the essentiality of MAR 
legislations in the EU if the result indicates that longer audit tenure actually leads to more earnings management of 
STOXX Europe 600 Index companies. 
1. Introduction  
The worldwide financial market since the beginning of the 21st century has experienced a large number 
of accounting scandals, most of which are associated with different levels of earnings management (e.g., 
Enron Corporation taking huge debts out of its balance sheet with the conviction of Big Five Arthur 
Andersen in 2001; WorldCom inflating eleven billion-dollar assets in 2002; Lehman Brothers Holdings 
hiding fifty billion-dollar loans with the suspicion of Big Four Ernst & Young in 2008; Toshiba’s 
admission of two billion- dollar earnings overstatement over seven years in 2015). To tackle with these 
shaming frauds in the financial market, many countries (e.g., the United States of America (U.S.) in 2002; 
the United Kingdom (UK) in 2012; the European Union (EU) in 2016) have enacted audit rotation rules 
in order to lower the degree of accounting frauds and to strengthen audit quality. The effectiveness of 
audit rotation in preventing earnings management and the essentiality of MAR enactment have received 
a lot of concern from academic researchers; however, there have still been controversies in academic 
world around this issue. 
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In the EU, companies in EU country members have been required to tender their audit engagement 
every ten years since June 17th, 2016. In terms of the impact of audit rotation on earnings management, 
there were several researchers investigating this issue; however, there has been little empirical study 
about its actual impact after the introduction of the new audit rotation rule in the EU in 2016. Thus, the 
need to explore the capability and the essentiality of this new rule in addressing earnings management 
issues in the EU is still a gap in academic world. Additonally, the audit rotation research theme has 
focused mostly on the impact of audit tenure rather than the number of times that a firm has changed 
its auditor over a period of time. These huge gaps in academic literature actually pave the way for this 
research to be undertaken to test the role of audit rotation activities, represented by the numbers of 
auditors employed in ten years, and audit tenure on lowering the degree of earnings management in EU 
stock market.  
This research intends to use the sample of companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600 Index to test the 
research’ s hypotheses, as the STOXX Europe 600 Index comprised 600 small, medium and large 
companies in the EU financial market. The investigated period of time is a ten-year period between 2006 
and 2015. The financial data of STOXX Europe 600 Index from 2006 and 2015 used in this study are 
expected to acquire from the Datastream database. This study will use discretionary accruals as a proxy 
to estimate the degree of earnings management basing on research of Matsumoto (2002); Myers et al. 
(2003); Davis et al., (2009). Discretionary accruals were calculated through the modified Jones Model 
suggested by Dechow et al. (1995), since this model was proved to be the most accurate method to test 
earnings management in Dechow et al. (1995)’s research.  
This research should make a great contribution to the growing body of audit rotation in two ways. 
Firstly, there are new proxies for this academic field proposed in this study. In particular, the use of the 
number of auditors as a main proxy for audit rotation activities may have not appeared in previously 
related academic research. Additionally, this research also adds the new dummy variable Big4 to control 
the influence of the audit rotation occurring within or outside Big Four audit companies. Secondly, as 
the considered period of time in this research includes years before and after the enactment of the new 
audit rule in the EU, the research can draw a latest and comprehensive picture about the impact of audit 
rotation on earnings management strategies of STOXX Europe 600 Index companies. 
However, due to some difficulties to access to Datastream Database in Hungary, the research cannot 
collect enough data to run the regression models. In spite of that, the expected results are believed 
suggest two main points. The first supposed result will be consistent with the results from prior research 
of Davis et al. (2009), Lennox et al. (2014) and Bell et al. (2015) when showing that the larger number 
of auditors empolyed by each firm in ten years, the lower degree of earnings management. If that, this 
result will be the confirmation for the effectiveness of MAR on decreasing earnings management in the 
EU. Besides, the second is believed to prove that longer tenure can result in more earnings management 
strategies, which will then affirm the fundamental need of MAR enactment in the EU.  
In the following part, the research demonstrates theoretical information about earnings management, 
the general background information about MAR and presents the review of prior related research, 
which then paves the way for the development of two hypotheses on the effect of audit rotation activities 
and audit tenure on earnings management. The following part illustrates the research method and the 
formation of two regression models. Finally, the research draws conclusions, points out any limitations 
and makes several suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
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2.1. Mandatory Audit Rotation Rules 
In order to confront with the widespread of accounting frauds, many countries around the world have 
enacted the Mandatory Audit Rotation rule with the hope to lower the degree of financial report 
misleading and enhance the audit quality. In one article pulished in 2015, the Ernst & Young Global 
Limited (EY) summarised the MAR rule in some countries around the world as followed: 
 
Source: EY Global Financial Services Institute. (2015)  
Figure 1.1 below draws an illustrative picture of important events related to MAR rule in the EU. 
FIGURE 1.1 
Auditing events in the EU 
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2.2. Earnings Management 
Earning management is the case that organization managers manipulate financial reports legally or 
illegally to demonstrate an untrue picture of the firm’s financial conditions. 
 ‘Earnings management occurs when managers apply their judgment to financial reporting, 
and/or construction of transactions in order to change financial reports and mislead stakeholders on 
issues concerning the operational performance of companies or they may alter the contractual results 
based on accounting numbers’  
The European Commission 
(E.C.) issued E.C. Directive 
2006/43/EC: 
 Key audit partner rotation is 
mandated after seven years  
in public interest entities  
(PIEs) 
 The key audit partner shall  
not be able to participate in  
the audit of the same entity  
for at least two years  
Member States were given  
two years to implement the  
directive (until Mid-2008) 
 
The European Parliament  
proposed audit firm 
rotation  as mandatory at 25 
years. 
However, after Germany 
and  Austria voted strongly 
against  such a long tenure, it 




To strengthen audit reports 
quality, a new statutory 
audit framework was 
introduced through 
Directive 2014/56/EU and 
Regulation 537/2014: 
 The audit firm tenure for 
PIEs will be limited to 10 
years. The same audit firm 
can be reappointed for 
another 14 years in case of 
joint audits or for another 10 
years in the case of a public 
tender. 
 The partner rotation 
remains  mandatory after 
seventh  engagement year 
The European Commission 
(E.C.) issued E.C. Directive 
2006/43/EC: 
 Key audit partner rotation is 
mandated after seven years  
in public interest entities  
(PIEs) 
 The key audit partner shall  
not be able to participate in  
the audit of the same entity  
for at least two years  
Member States were given  
two years to implement the  
directive (until Mid-2008) 
 
Source: EY Global Financial Services Institute. (2015) 
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Chen and Tsai, 2010, p.955 
As investors normally have a tendency to assess good earnings as a positive sign for a firm’s financial 
health, many managers try to manage their earnings in order to meet the investors’ expectation. In a 
research of Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006); Bae, Cheon and Kang (2008), investors and bondholders 
are proved to perform strong reaction to firms’ earnings announcements. It is the influence of earnings 
reports on investor behaviour that incentivize managers to choose their earnings-optimizing financial 
reporting strategies (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Goel and Thakor, 2003). Then, earnings 
management is an effective tool for managers to increase earnings with the intention of confronting 
future earnings disappointments (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997a; Matsumoto, 2002; Burgstahler and 
Eames, 2006). 
However, the benefits gained from earnings management appear to be only for the short term. 
According to Brooks (2010), shareholders may gradually find it more difficult to predict correct risk or 
return evaluation, sooner or later the lenders would discover that they have been misled. Losing trust 
and confidence from the investors and creditors in this course of action is the biggest managerial 
mistake that can defeat even the strongest organizations, as long-term business does not stand a chance 
without the support of its stakeholders. Thus, the negative consequences suffered from earnings 
manipulation would far outweigh the benefits acquired. 
2.3 Mandatory audit rotation activities 
As regards reasons given to approve of the MAR enactment, as emphasized by The Conference Board 
(2003), audit rotation could bring ‘a fresh look’ (The Conference Board, 2003, p.39) to corporate’s 
finance, and the work of an auditor could improve due to the peer pressure from his or her successor 
auditors. According to Lennox et al. (2014), the peer review between predecessor and successor 
auditors paves the way for the higher detection of financial reporting frauds, which can result in the 
significant audit adjustment in last years of an audit term. Using data from non-financial companies on 
the Milan Stock Exchange between 1985 and 2004 and applying an accruals-based measure, Cameran, 
Prencipeand, Trombetta (2016)’s research result also supports what is indicated in Lennox et al. 
(2014)‘s research. These researchers point out that higher audit quality in the last years will occur as 
auditors become more conservative towards the conclusion of the auditing term. If a company does not 
have to change their external auditors after a number of years, it cannot witness the higher audit quality 
in the first and last years of an auditing term.  
However, many people neither support for nor believe in the capability of MAR. As noticed in the study 
conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2003, the drawbacks of MAR are suggested to 
be the lack of specific knowledge about a firm of a new auditor. Researches conducted by Davis, Soo and 
Trompeter, 2009; Daugherty et al., 2012; Litt et al., 2014; Bell, Causholli and Knechel, 2015 also 
demonstrate that the unfamiliarity of new auditors with their clients lead to low audit quality in the first 
several years of an auditing term.  Besides, the research of Carcello and Nagy (2004) shows that: ‘… 
companies that change auditors are more likely to have financial reporting problems, rather than 
reflecting any problems with the audit process itself during the early years of the auditor-client 
relationship’ (Carcello and Nagy, 2004, p.67). 
Overall, the potentiality of MAR has received widespread concern from legislators, regulators and 
academic researchers as well as all economic entities. Although the effectiveness of MAR has been 
 International Journal of Engineering and Management Sciences (IJEMS) Vol. 5. (2020). No. 1 
DOI: 10.21791/IJEMS.2020.1.19 
examined many times, the results collected remain conflicting and have not yet led to final agreements. 
Based on the belief of MAR legislators and supporters, the first hypothesis is built as the following: 
Hypothesis 1: More audit rotation activities have a statistically positive effect on lessening the 
degree of earnings management. 
2.4 Audit tenure 
Besides the concern about the validation of MAR, researchers also raise a question about the 
relationship between the length of an auditing term and financial reporting quality. Similar to studies 
regarding MAR, the results from audit tenure researches are also mixed, leading to the current global 
debate about audit tenure.  
As stated before, one of the fundamental targets of MAR is to shorten the long audit tenure of most 
companies, which is considered as the root of weak auditor independence. In academic research, Lennox 
et al. (2014) strengthen the approving opinion on MAR enactments by indicating that a strong mutual 
bond between auditors and firms in a long auditor-client relationship, which leads to poor audit quality 
and low independence, could be hampered thanks to MAR. Bell et al. (2015) and Davis et al. (2009) 
similarly discovered that the longer the audit tenure, the higher the discretionary accruals, which are 
currently proxies for earnings management evaluation. In addition, according to Davis et al. (2009), 
Harris and Whisenant (2012) and Bell et al. (2015), although the audit quality of first-year auditors is 
not assessed to be high, the audit quality will gradually experience a significant improvement in the 
following years. However, after several-years of improvement, the longer the audit tenure, the weaker 
the reliability of the financial reporting statements. Thus, what can be learned from research of Davis et 
al. (2009), Harris and Whisenant (2012) and Bell et al. (2015) is that long audit tenure should be avoided 
as it results in poor audit quality. Hence, the elimination of auditor independence and accounting frauds 
due to long auditor-client relationship may be considered as the most principal intention of MAR 
enactments.  
On the other hand,, Bell et al. (2015)’s research mention the accumulated client-specific knowledge of 
long-term auditors, which could contributes to higher audit quality. However, several researchers 
suggest that there is no relation between audit tenure and financial reporting quality; therefore, it 
should be unnecessary to apply MAR to reduce the weakening of auditor independence. The finding 
about the non-correlated relationship between long audit-firm tenure (over nine years) and financial 
reporting quality is stated by the research conducted by Johnson et al. (2002), who use the data of Big 
Six clients in US between 1986 and 1995 and two proxies for financial reporting quality evaluation 
(unexpected accruals and future income), and Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007), who review data of 618 
private Belgian companies.  
Hence, the relationship between audit tenure and earnings management detection is still the 
contentious topic among academic researchers, and it needs to be determined in further research. 
Consistent with the reason for MAR enactment, the second hypothesis of this research is given as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Longer audit tenure has a statistically positive influence on the increase in the 
degree of earnings management. 




The sample firms used to answer the two research questions are all firms listed in STOXX EUROPE 600 
INDEX The STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX companies are selected because the STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX 
consists of 600 small, medium and large companies listed in the STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX instead. All 
the data used in this research will be secondary data extracted from Datastream database.  
Yearly historical financial data of STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX companies are scrutinized for the period 
between 2009 and 2018, because this period experienced a variety of significant occurrences in the 
worldwide financial market. the ten-year audit tendering rule for STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX companies 
in 2016. 
3.2 Multivariate regression models 
The modified cross-sectional model of discretionary accruals, which was developed by Dechow et al. 
(1995) from the Jones Model, is used to get discretionary accruals. According to Dechow et al. (1995)’s 
research, the modified version of the Jones Model is the most effective method to test earning 
managements behaviour for an event-years sample, because this model controls the change in firms’ 
receivables and contains less bias in earnings managements measurement. This study uses Eviews for 
the statistical and econometrics analysis. Regression models adopted in this research are semi-
logarithmic models (log-lin models). The method adopted to estimate two regression models mentioned 
above will be Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. 
The first target of this study is to examine the effectiveness of MAR rule in the UK by exploring whether 
the audit rotation activities can make a contribution to preventing earnings management strategies. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is given below:  
Hypothesis 1: More audit rotation activities have a statistically positive effect on lessening the 
degree of earnings management. 
The first multivariate regression model to test Hypothesis 1 is estimated as the following: 
𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑈𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑅 _𝑂𝐹_𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑂𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸_𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸
+  𝛽3𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸_𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐸_𝑇𝐻𝐴𝑁_𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸 +  𝛽4𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +  𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿)
+  𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝑇𝑂_𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿)
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
On the other hand, the second goal of this study is to test the necessity of MAR enactment. As mentioned 
in the Literature Review chapter, accounting frauds are thought to have their roots from long audit 
tenure MAR legislators and supporters; thus, it is necessary to enact MAR rules. Therefore, the 
essentiality of MAR enactment in the UK will be reaffirmed if longer audit tenure is proved to result in 
more earnings management if STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX companies. Based on this belief, the second 
hypothesis of this study is given below: 
 Hypothesis 2: Longer audit tenure has a statistically positive influence on the increase in the 
degree of earnings management. 
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In order to test Hypothesis 2, the multivariate regression model is built as the following: 
 𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑈𝑅𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑁𝐺 +  𝛽4𝐵𝐼𝐺4 +  𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) +
 𝛽6𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝛽8𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇_𝑇𝑂_𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) +
𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝛽10𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑖,𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                            
where: 
LDAi,t                     = log of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t, a proxy for the  
          degree of earnings management. 
NUMBER OF AUDITORS              = number of auditors employed by each firm from 2000 to 2015. 
CHANGE_ONCE                              = the situation when a firm changes its auditor once in ten years, 
          dummy variable equalling to 1 for this situation; 0 otherwise. 
CHANGE_MORE_THAN_ONCE   = the situation when a firm changes its auditor more than once in  
                                                                ten years, dummy variable equalling to 0 for this situation; 0 otherwise. 
BIG4                    = auditor switch within Big Four or keeping one Big Four auditor   
         in ten years  dummy variable equalling to 1 if a firm change  its  
         auditor from one Big Four to another; 0 otherwise. 
TENURE                  = the number of years of a continuous auditor-client engagement. 
SHORT                            = short audit tenure, dummy variable equalling 1 for 3 years and 
                  less of auditor-client relationship; 0 otherwise. 
LONG              = long audit tenure, dummy variable equalling 1 for ten years and  
     more of auditor-client relationship; 0 otherwise. 
SIZEi,t               = firm size of firm i in year t, defined as the log of total assets. 
AGE              = firm age of firm i in year 2015, defined as number of years the  
     firm listed in the Index. 
ROA i,t              = return on assets listed in the Index, defined as the ratio of net  
     income to total assets. 
MARKET TO BOOK i,t             = market to book value of firm i in year t, defined as the ratio of  
     market capitalization to book value of equity. 
LEVERAGEi,t             = leverage ratio of firm i in year t, defined as the ratio of total debt  
     to total assets. 
CASHFLOWi,t                          = firms’ cash flow of firm i in year t, defined as the ratio of  
     operating cash flow to total assets.   
4.  Conclusion 
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In these recent years, the mushrooming increase in the number of accounting scandals, which are mostly 
related to earnings management, and the worrisome drop in audit quality have gradually eroded 
investors’ confidence in financial reporting statements and have posed a question about external 
auditor credibility. In order to address this emerging issue in financial reporting, audit rotation 
requirement rules have been enacted in many countries. This study is designed in the context of over 
three years after the MAR enacted in the EU, so that it can help to satisfy the urgent need for research 
about the efficiency of this MAR rule in lowering the degree of earnings management and enhancing the 
audit quality. The first question aims to test the capability of MAR in the EU by examining whether more 
audit rotation activities, which are presented by the number of auditors employed by STOXX EUROPE 
600 INDEX companies from 2009 to 2018, can contribute to lowering the degree of earnings 
management. The second one tries to confirm the necessity of MAR enactment by scrutinizing whether 
longer audit tenure actually results in the rising level of earnings management.  
Although the findings have not reached yet because of the lack of database, this research is believed to 
bring new perspectives and evidence to the growing body of literature about the relationship between 
audit rotation and earnings management in the future. It will be needed for both rule legislators to test 
the right of their rule enactment decision, investors, auditors and all stock market entities.   
Further research can be conducted with the purpose of recommending either the number of times that 
each company should switch its auditor within a specific period of time, or the best appropriate audit 
tenure of each auditor-client relationship to achieve the ultimate objectives of MAR in weakening the 
level of earnings management. Furthermore, investigating how auditor switches occurring within or 
outside Big Four affects the capability of MAR will be another helpful addition to this research area. The 
relationship between the competition in audit industry and MAR is well worth considering in future 
audit rotation research. Finally, further research on UK financial market is suggested to be undertaken 
with longer investigated of time to provide more clear evidence for the effectiveness of MAR. The 
observation of STOXX EUROPE 600 INDEX companies in the recommended time frame could draw a 
clearer picture about the effect of audit rotation on earnings management in the EU.   
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